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Abstract. The spokes model is an oligopoly model with product differen-
tiation recently developed by Chen and Riordan. For the purpose of repre-
senting markets of cultural goods such as books and cinemas, we propose
a tractable extension of the spokes model by introducing uncertainty about
consumer trend from the point of view of firms. In this extension, many fea-
tures such as expected demand, price and expected profit of a firm remain
the same as in the original model.
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1 Introduction
Spatial representation is one of the fundamental tools for theoretical analysis
of oligopolistic competition. Following the seminal work of Hotelling (1929),
scholars have studied and presented many spatial models. The spokes model,
recently developed by Chen and Riordan (2007), is among these and pos-
sesses several interesting features. In this model, the shape of the space on
which consumers are located resembles the spokes of a wheel. At the end
of each spoke, a variety of a differentiated product is located and a firm
to produce that variety is also located if it exists. The distance from each
consumer to a variety represents her taste for that variety, and firms price
their varieties to maximize their profits. The spokes model can deal with the
situation where a firm have to compete equally with all other firms, whereas
in the popular circle model, which is initiated by Salop (1979), firms only
compete with nearby firms. Chen and Riordan (2007) consider the spokes
model with symmetric firms and no demand uncertainty, and calculate de-
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mand, price, and profit of each firm in the equilibrium.1 They also consider
the number of firms when there is free entry to the market.2
Because of symmetric global competition among firms, the spokes model
may be useful for studying cultural goods such as books, cinemas and video
games.3 One feature in a cultural good market is that some consumers
have their own tastes and different valuations of each variety, and this is
represented quite well in the original spokes model. Another important
feature is the existence of trends among consumers. Usually, sales of some
varieties boom and others slump.4 It is usually quite difficult for firms to
acquire knowledge about trends in the near future when producing varieties.
In other words, there is uncertainty about consumer trends from the point
of view of firms. While Chen and Riordan (2007) consider the deterministic
case without any uncertainty, this note constructs a tractable extension of
the spokes model with uncertainty and ex-post asymmetry in the demand
of consumers, with consideration of application to cultural goods markets.5
Section 2 is preliminary. In Section 3, we first consider the simple and
extreme case in which all consumers are strongly affected by a trend. We
refer to this case as the extreme bandwagon effect case. After firms price their
varieties, a variety is revealed to be the bestseller with equal probability and
all consumers turn out to be on the spoke of the bestseller. Firms’ pricing
strategies are based on their expected profits. Then we can calculate that the
expected demand for a variety is the same as the demand in the deterministic
case by Chen and Riordan (2007). This implies that the price and the
expected profit for a firm are also the same to those in Chen and Riordan
(2007). In Section 4, we consider a more general setting. Usually, whereas
some consumers follow a trend, others stick to their own tastes. Hence, we
introduce a parameter that represents the proportion of consumers affected
by the trend. This is an intermediate case between the extreme bandwagon
case and the deterministic case analyzed by Chen and Riordan (2007). Given
the argument in Section 3, expected demand, price, and expected profit of
1Another interesting feature of the spokes model is that when the valuation of con-
sumers on varieties is relatively low, price increases in the number of firms. This feature
is further discussed in Chen and Riordan (2008).
2Notable extensions of the spokes model include the following. Caminal and Granero
(2012) and Granero (2013) consider the case that the number of firms are quite large
and there are both multi-product and single-product firms. Reggiani (2014) considers an
extension with firms’ location choices and studies asymmetric equilibria. All these models
do not incorporate uncertainty.
3 Caminal (2010) studies translation activities of cultural goods by using an extended
spokes model.
4There are many empirical studies of trends among consumers in cultural goods mar-
kets. Sorensen (2007) and Carare (2012) consider the effects of bestseller lists on trends in
the markets of books and application software, respectively. Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006)
consider the effect of consumer reviews on sales in the online book market.
5In Hotelling’s duopoly framework, Meagher and Zauner (2004) study how demand
uncertainty affects the location choices of firms.
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a firm are the same as in the deterministic case.6 If new entrants care only
for that the expected profit is nonnegative, under free entry, the number of
firms is also the same to that in Chen and Riordan (2007). Additionally, we
discuss the free entry condition if firms care for ex-post nonnegative profit.
This note introduces demand uncertainty into the spokes model with
consideration of application to cultural goods markets. Even though there
are various ways of introducing consumer distributions and probabilities, the
approach in this extension is simple and natural, and maintains the global
symmetry among varieties, which is a key property that makes the original
model interesting. In this extension, important properties such as expected
demand, price, and expected profit remain the same as in the original model.
Hence, one can apply most of the results in Chen and Riordan (2007) to the
markets with demand uncertainty.
2 Preliminaries
Most notations follow Chen and Riordan (2007). There are i = 1, 2, . . . , N
potential varieties of a differentiated product. In the geometric representa-
tion, there are N spokes (or lines). Each spoke is denoted as `i, the length
of each spoke is 1/2 and the end of all spokes are connected at the center.
The other end point of `i, at which variety i is located, is called the origin
of the spoke.
There are j = 1, 2, . . . , n firms with 2 ≤ n ≤ N . Firm j is also located
at the origin of `j and produces variety j. Thus variety j = 1, 2, . . . , n is
actually produced and available for consumers, while variety i = n+1, . . . , N
is not produced and unavailable for consumers.7 The constant marginal cost
of production is normalized to zero.
Consumers are distributed over spokes. The total mass of consumers is
assumed to be 1. The form of the distribution is later discussed. Consumer
(`i, xi) is at a point on `i with the distance xi from the origin of `i where i is
located. Variety i is first preferred by consumer (`i, xi), and her valuation of
this variety is v − xi. v is the same for all consumers. Her second preferred
variety k 6= i is randomly chosen by nature with probability 1/(N − 1), and
her valuation of variety k is v−(1−xi). Note that 1−xi is the distance from
(`i, xi) to k. Also note that each of varieties i and k could be available or
unavailable. Her valuation on any variety other than i and k is zero. Given
a price profile (p1, . . . , pn) and consumer (`i, xi)’s first and second preferred
varieties i and k, she purchases i if (i) i is available and v − xi − pi > 0 and
(ii) v−xi−pi ≥ v−(1−xi)−pk or k is unavailable, and she purchases k if (i)
k is available and v− (1−xi)−pk > 0 and (ii) v− (1−xi)−pk > v−xi−pi
6 Orbacha and Einavb (2007) discuss several reasons why the uniform price rule is
adapted in the cinema industry.
7See Figure 1 in Chen and Riordan (2007) for a graphical illustration.
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or i is unavailable. Otherwise, she purchases nothing.
The timing of the revelation of information is as follows. (1) In the ex-
ante stage, firms simultaneously price their varieties. At this point, firms do
not know the distribution of consumers. They only know the probability of
the occurrence of each consumer distribution. On this basis, firms maximize
their expected profits. (2) In the ex-post stage, the distribution of consumers
is revealed to firms, and the demand for each variety can be calculated.
The forms of the distributions of consumers distributions are discussed in
Sections 3 and 4.
In terms of game theory, players are firms, and their strategies are the
prices of their varieties. We focus on symmetric pure strategy Nash equilib-
ria.
3 The extreme bandwagon effect case
First, consider the extreme case in which all consumers are under a band-
wagon effect. In the ex-ante stage, firms only know that with probability
1/N , each variety will be the bestseller (or winner). In the ex-post stage, a
variety i becomes the bestseller and all consumers turn out to be uniformly
distributed over spoke `i. From the point of view of firms, in the ex-ante
stage, consumers are distributed uniformly over all spokes. In the ex-post
stage, because of the trend, all consumers on spokes other than `i move 1/2
length toward a variety i.
Firm j prices the variety based on the expected profit. Let variety b be
the bestseller revealed in the ex-post stage. From firm j’s point of view,
there are essentially three potential ex-post situations. Case 1 is that the
bestseller b is produced by firm j, i.e., b = j. This occurs with probability
1/N . Case 2 is that the bestseller b is not j and is available. This case
occurs with probability (n − 1)/N . Case 3 is that the bestseller b is not
available. This case occurs with probability (N − n)/N . Let q1j denote the
ex-post demand for variety j in Case 1 and q3j denote that in Case 3. In
Case 2, the ex-post demand for variety j varies depending on the price of
the bestseller pb. Thus let q2jb be the ex-post demand for variety j when firm
b produces the bestseller. We make calculations for each case.
Case 1. q1j can be calculated as follows.
q1j =2 · (
1
N − 1 ·
∑
k∈{1,...,n}\{j}
max{min{1
2
+
pk − pj
2
,
1
2
}, 0}
+
N − n
N − 1 ·max{min{v − pj ,
1
2
}, 0})
In the above expression, 2 is the density of consumers on `j . The first term in
the bracket represents the size of consumers whose second preferred varieties
are available. The proportion of consumers whose second preferred varieties
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is k is 1/(N−1). Note that the marginal consumer who is indifferent between
j and k considers that
v − pj − xj = v − pk − (1− xj) ⇐⇒ xj = 12 +
pk − pj
2
as long as she is certainly on `j , i.e., xj ∈ [0, 1/2]. If 1/2 + (pk − pj)/2 >
1/2, all consumers on `j demand variety j. If 1/2 + (pk − pj)/2 < 0, all
consumers on `j demand variety k. The second term in the bracket calculates
the demand of consumers whose second preferred varieties are not available
and (N − n)/(N − 1) is the proportion of those consumers. The marginal
consumer who is indifferent between purchasing j and nothing considers that
v − pj − xj = 0 ⇐⇒ xj = v − pj
as long as she is on `j .
Case 2. q2jb can be calculated as follows.
q2jb = 2 ·
1
N − 1 ·max{min{
pb − pj
2
,
1
2
}, 0}
2 in the above expression is the density of consumers on `b. 1/(N −1) is the
proportion of consumers whose second preferred variety is j. The condition
for the marginal consumer who is indifferent between b and j is that as long
as she is on `b,
v − pb − xb = v − pj − (1− xb) ⇐⇒ xb = 12 +
pj − pb
2
Thus the length of the part of `b on which there exist consumers who prefers
j to b is that 1/2− xb = (pb − pj)/2.
Case 3. q3j can be calculated as follows.
q3j = 2 ·
1
N − 1 ·max{min{v − pj −
1
2
,
1
2
}, 0}
2 in the above expression is the density of consumers on `b. 1/(N − 1) is
the proportion of consumers who consider variety j as their second preferred
one. The condition for the marginal consumer who is indifferent between
purchasing j and nothing is that as long as she is on `b,
v − pj − (1− xb) = 0 ⇐⇒ xb = −v + pj + 1
Thus the length of the part of `b on which there exist consumers who prefers
j to nothing is that 1/2− xb = v − pj − 1/2.
Now let us focus on the ex-ante stage and calculate expected demand qj
for firm j.
qj =
1
N
· q1j +
∑
b∈{1,...,n}\{j}
1
N
· q2jb +
N − n
N
· q3j
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=2 · 1
N
· 1
N − 1 ·
∑
k∈{1,...,n}\{j}
max{min{1
2
+
pk − pj
2
, 1}, 0}
+ 2 · 1
N
· N − n
N − 1 ·max{min{v − pj , 1}, 0}
By comparing this expression with Chen and Riordan (2007), it turns out
that qj is actually equivalent to the exact demand for firm j in the deter-
ministic case.
Chen and Riordan (2007) calculate the symmetric equilibrium price by
a firm in the deterministic case under the condition that 1 ≤ v ≤ 2(N −
1)/(n− 1) + (2N − n− 1)/{2(N − n)}.8 Even in the current model, firm j
maximizes its expected profit pj · qj in the ex-ante stage, which is the same
as in Chen and Riordan (2007). Thus price and expected profit of a firm
can be calculated as in Chen and Riordan (2007). In summary, we have the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the extreme bandwagon case, expected demand, price,
and expected profit of a firm in the symmetric equilibrium are the same as
those in the deterministic case of Chen and Riordan (2007).
According to Proposition 1 of Chen and Riordan (2007), the price by a
firm in the symmetric equilibrium p∗ depends on four regions of v as follows.
p∗ =

2N − n− 1
n− 1 if
2(N − 1)
n− 1 < v ≤
2(N − 1)
n− 1 +
2N − n− 1
2(N − n) (Region 1)
v − 1 if 2 < v ≤ 2(N − 1)
n− 1 (Region 2)
2(N − n)v + (n− 1)
4N − 3n− 1 if
1
2
+
N − 1
2N − n− 1 < v ≤ 2 (Region 3)
v − 1
2
if 1 < v ≤ 1
2
+
N − 1
2N − n− 1 (Region 4)
Based on the price p∗, we can calculate the ex-post demand for a firm in
the symmetric equilibrium. Let q#∗ be the ex-post demand in Case #. In
Case 1, i.e., when the producing variety becomes the bestseller, q1∗ = 1. In
Case 2, i.e., when the bestseller is available and produced by another firm,
q2∗j = 0. In Case 3, i.e., when the bestseller is not available,
q3∗ =

1/(N − 1) (Region 1)
1/(N − 1) (Region 2)
4Nv − 4N − 2nv + n− 2v + 3
(N − 1)(4N − 3n− 1) (Region 3)
0 (Region 4)
8This is the condition for the existence of oligopolistic competition and the symmetric
pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
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Note that in Region 3, a certain proportion of consumers do not purchase
the variety. The ex-post profit for a firm in Case # is then easily calculated
as p∗ · q#∗. In the ex-post sense, there are both cases: One in which all
consumers buy a variety and one in which no one buys anything, even though
the expected total demand in the market is the same as the total demand
in the deterministic case of Chen and Riordan (2007).
4 The degree of uncertainty from the point of view
of firms
In the previous section, we considered the extreme case of the bandwagon
effect on consumers. In this section, we consider a more natural and gen-
eral setting. In a market of cultural goods, there are often two types of
consumers: those possessing own tastes and unaffected by others, and those
affected by a trend.
Let r ∈ [0, 1] be the proportion of consumers who are affected by a
trend. In the ex-ante stage, from the point of view of firms, all consumers
are uniformly distributed over all spokes. In the ex-post stage, variety i is
revealed to be the bestseller with probability 1/N and r of consumers turn
out to be uniformly distributed over `i. r − 1 of consumers, who are not
affected by the trend, continue to be uniformly distributed over all N spokes
in the ex-post stage. r may also be thought of as the degree of uncertainty
from the point of view of firms. Note that if r = 1, it is the extreme
bandwagon case discussed in Section 3. If r = 0, it is the deterministic case
discussed in Chen and Riordan (2007). Whether r = 0 or r = 1, the firms’
expected demand is the same.9 Hence, we can easily obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. For any degree of uncertainty, expected demand, price, and
expected profit of a firm in the symmetric equilibrium are the same as those
in the deterministic case in Chen and Riordan (2007).
Chen and Riordan (2007) calculate the number of firms as a free entry
equilibrium. Given a fixed entry cost f > 0, the equilibrium number of firms
n∗ ∈ [0, N ] satisfies pi∗(n∗) ≥ f ≥ pi∗(n∗ + 1) if n∗ < N and pi∗(n∗) ≥ f
if n∗ = N , where pi∗(n∗) is the equilibrium profit in the deterministic case
when the number of firms is n∗.
In this extension, the same condition for the entry of firms holds as long
as a firm cares for whether the expected profit is larger than zero. This is
quite a usual case.
9It is obvious that there exist alternative ways to formulate distributions and their
probabilities with maintaining the same expected demand as long as a certain symmetry
of distributions holds.
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There may also be an industry with limited funds and firms that need to
be careful to avoid bankruptcy if a trend goes toward a variety of another
firm or unavailable one. The industry of minor genre book publishers is an
example. As suggested in Section 3, in the worst case, a firm j has zero
demand from consumers under the bandwagon effect in the ex-post stage
and hence obtains zero profit from them. Therefore, if firms take the ex-post
nonnegative profit condition into account, then the number of firms in the
free entry equilibrium should satisfy that
(1− r) · pi∗(n∗) ≥ f ≥ (1− r) · pi∗(n∗ + 1) ⇐⇒ pi∗(n∗) ≥ f
1− r ≥ pi
∗(n∗ + 1)
if n∗ < N , and pi∗(n∗) ≥ f/(1 − r) if n∗ = N . The argument about
the number of firms in the free-entry equilibrium in Section 3 of Chen and
Riordan (2007) can be applied to this case by replacing f in them with
f/(1 − r). According to Proposition 2 of Chen and Riordan (2007), if v
is relatively high, i.e., in Region 1 or 2, n∗ essentially decreases in f in
the deterministic case.10 Thus we obtain that if v is relatively high and r
increases, essentially the number of firms n∗ may decrease. In other words,
if firms care about ex-post nonnegative profits, the degree of uncertainty
may reduce the number of varieties available to consumers.
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